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I. Introduction 
 
An emerging literature in economics has revealed the importance of social networks in 
household decision-making (Kremer and Miguel, 2003; Conley and Udry, 2008; Munshi and Myeaux, 
2006).  At the same time, it is well-recognized that personal relationships play a large role in credit 
access, particularly in developing countries (Basu, 1984; Udry, 1994; Fafchamps, 2000; Okten and 
Osili, 2004).  Our research brings these two strands of literature together to ascertain the influence, 
and the nature of the influence, that social networks have on credit access.  Because there remains a 
gap in the literature in our understanding of why certain households take microfinance loans and 
others do not, we are particularly interested in the influence that social networks may have on 
microfinance borrowing.   
The data used in our study comes from a survey of 465 households located in five proximate 
villages in the western highlands of Guatemala.  We find that microfinance borrowing by households 
is positively related with the level of education and negatively related to wealth level in both a 
household's village and church network.  We also discover that while geographical networks appear to 
significantly influence household decision-making in the adoption of consumer technologies such as 
cell phones and televisions, church networks appear to play the predominant role in determining 
household sources of credit.  Moreover, we calculate an elasticity of social imitation for microfinance 
and find point estimates for this elasticity very close to that for formal loans and moneylender credit. 
For each of these three types of credit, a doubling of the number of the households in a church 
network with a given type of credit is associated with an approximately 15% increase in the probability 
of a household holding that particular type of credit, controlling for other factors that influence 
behavioral similarities.  We argue that the strong peer effects found in church networks make sense in 
the context of the tremendous political, economic, and religious changes that have occurred in 
Guatemala's recent history, where the 36-year civil war eroded family and neighbor relationships, and 
the evangelical protestant churches played a major role in filling the gap of social support.   
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Manski (1995) suggests three basic categories of reasons why we might observe behavioral 
imitation within social networks.  The first of these he calls a correlated effect, in which individuals in 
the same group tend to behave similarly because they face similar environments or by their 
characteristics they self-select into a given social network.  For example, rough terrain around a 
village may render car transportation difficult, so that many people ride bikes.  The second category 
he identifies is a contextual effect, in which the propensity for a given type of behavior varies with the 
background characteristics of the people in a social network.  For example, widespread poverty 
within a village may preclude the level of economic prosperity necessary to provide individual 
households the financial means for purchasing bicycles.  The third category Manski labels an 
endogenous effect, in which for example the propensity for owning a bicycle literally varies with 
prevalence of bicycle ownership in the particular reference group.  When endogenous effects exist, 
genuine imitation occurs within a network, but these endogenous effects can take many forms. 
Young (1998) classifies three potential types of endogenous effects.  Endogenous effects can 
be of pure conformity in which fashion or fad dictate behavior within a particular network.  A girl rides a 
bicycle because she wants to “fit in” with her peers, who all ride bicycles.  A second motive may be 
instrumental conformity: people in a village all ride the same type of bicycle because it makes it easier 
for each to obtain spare parts.  A third type of endogenous effect may be brought about through 
informational conformity: A boy sees another boy in his social network enjoying a bicycle.  This signals 
to him that riding a bicycle yields a higher level of utility than he otherwise believed, making him want 
one himself.  Ellison and Fudenberg (1993) refer to this as "word of mouth" learning, and in the 
context of limited information, behavior within a network may converge toward uniformity.   
Some of these explanations are more likely than others in explaining similar sources of 
credit within a network.  Correlated effects could be present if bad weather hits a given area, 
forcing everyone to borrow from an agricultural credit cooperative created by the state to aid 
struggling farmers.  We could observe contextual effects if people with different levels of income 
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or education tend to seek similar sources of credit, and education levels are correlated within 
networks.  Endogenous effects in borrowing seem unlikely to occur through a desire for pure 
conformity.  However, networks may play a number of roles with credit that are related to a 
combination of informational and instrumental conformity. 
The following are a few examples.  Networks may be a source of information: An individual 
A may expose a friend in his network, B, to opportunities of which B was previously unaware, for 
example that C offers a superior credit contract than other opportunities available to B.  Second, 
networks can help serve a screening function: A may introduce B to his lender, C.  If C trusts A, and 
knows that A has an interest in maintaining this trust, then C should take A’s recommendation of B 
as a strong signal of B’s reliability.  Third, reputation within networks may serve as a kind of social 
collateral for loans, producing a kind of instrumental conformity in which borrowers access loans 
from the same lenders in a network: C may offer a loan to B partly based on B’s reputational 
collateral that also involves another of his borrowers, A, a merchant who also deals regularly with B.  
If B’s repayment performance is common knowledge within the network, B’s failure to repay may 
send a negative signal to A about B’s trustworthiness.  Knowing that B wants to maintain his 
reputation with A (as well as perhaps with C), C may be willing to grant loans to B as well as to A. 
Our work on sources of credit is closely related to several recent papers on other kinds of 
behavioral choices influenced by networks within developing countries.  Kremer and Miguel 
(2003) utilize a randomized implementation of a school-based de-worming program in Kenya to 
study the impact of social networks on the adoption of worm-treatment drugs.  They interviewed 
children and parents of the children who participated in the de-worming program, obtaining 
information on their social networks.  Their survey focused on the five individuals they spoke with 
most frequently, relatives with whom they had frequent social interaction, and individuals with 
whom they discussed child health issues.  But because many of the early subjects had unpleasant 
experiences with the treatment, Kremer and Miguel find that children who were linked in a social 
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network to those who had already taken the drugs were less likely to take the treatment than other 
children.  Specifically, every social link by parents with other parents of children exposed to the 
treatment is associated with a 3.1 percentage point lower likelihood of a child taking the treatment.  
A social link between teenagers reduced the probability of receiving the treatment by 2.8 
percentage points, while direct links between small children predictably displayed no significant 
effect on adoption.   
Conley and Udry (2001, 2008) study pineapple farmers in Ghana, analyzing optimal 
application of fertilizer to their crop.  Because pineapple in this region was a new export crop, 
many farmers were still learning proper cultivation techniques.  Detailed information was collected 
on "informational neighbors," farmers who talked to one another about farming practices.  They 
find convincing evidence of social learning among their networks of pineapple farmers, notably 
that a given farmer is likely to adjust his fertilizer away from the levels of information neighbors 
who had realized lower than expected pineapple profits, and toward that of successful information 
neighbors.  Furthermore Conley and Udry find that inexperienced pineapple farmers in their 
survey rely on information from their neighbors to a greater extent than experienced pineapple 
farmers, and that the behavior of the experienced farmers was imitated more frequently than 
inexperienced ones.  Their earlier work also shows that when information is incomplete and 
travels through networks, farmers who keep track of observations over a longer period of time will 
benefit from optimal learning. 
A third paper related to our research is Munshi and Myaux (2006), which examines 
neighborhood effects in contraceptive use in Bangladesh.  During the late 1970s, an intensive family 
planning program was launched that provided both free contraceptives and free visits by community 
health workers to 144,000 households.  The striking result from their study is the effect of religious 
ties on the pattern of contraceptive adoption within villages.  Contraceptive adoption varied 
considerably between religious groups in the same village.  The behavior of individual women was 
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strongly responsive to the prevalence of contraceptive use by other women within their own 
religious group (either Hindu or Muslim), but unresponsive to the prevalence of contraceptive use by 
others.  Even after partitioning their sample of women across other variables, such as age and 
education, the authors find endogenous effects in the adoption of contraceptives between groups.  
For example, illiterate women were influenced not only by other illiterate women, but by literate 
women, and even vice-versa.  Munshi and Myaux conclude that the origin of these patterns lies in 
the purda, a section of Islamic law that severely restricts young married women to socializing only 
among women of the same religious group.  They interpret the results as a desire for social 
conformity among this group of women.   
The contrast in the three studies is interesting. While Kremer and Miguel (2003) and 
Conley and Udry (2008) reveal evidence of informational conformity within networks, Munshi and 
Myaux’s study on contraception appears to reveal imitation in networks based on pure social 
conformity.  In this respect our study most closely resembles the first two studies, where we 
attempt to identify endogenous effects that are unlikely to be due to a desire for pure social 
conformity, but rather for specific issues related to the adverse selection and moral hazards that 
surround credit transactions. 
 The implications of our work may have a particular bearing on understanding the diffusion 
of microfinance as a source of credit access in developing countries.  While a privileged few 
households in developing countries are able to access formal sources of credit, the vast majority 
borrow from informal sources, such as moneylenders, friends, and extended family.  For many 
households, the introduction of microfinance represents a superior form of credit access, where 
transaction costs are significantly lower than formal borrowing, and interest rates are significantly 
lower than informal borrowing.  Yet the potential benefits microfinance may bring over existing 
types of credit may not be immediately or equally recognized within a population.  To date, over 
133 million households in developing countries have accessed microfinance (Microcredit Summit, 
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2007).  But in each of these instances, a microfinance loan represents the intersection between an 
opportunity and a choice of a household to participate; the introduction of a new development 
program or technology into a particular region is clearly a necessary but insufficient condition for 
adoption.  A better understanding of the influence of social networks on credit access may help to 
facilitate the introduction of potentially welfare-enhancing initiatives such as microfinance, just as it 
does in the diffusion of new technologies that offer potential improvements in worker productivity, 
education, and health. 
 The next section of our paper describes geographical location and nature of our field survey.  
Section III presents our empirical model and estimations.  Section IV concludes. 
II. Field Research 
Our field survey was carried out from June through August of 2004 in the department 
(province) of Sololá located in the western highlands of Guatemala. The region is predominately 
populated with indigenous Quiché and Tzutujil people of Mayan decent living in small rural villages. 
Household surveys were administered to 465 households in five different villages ranging from the 
Atitlán lakeshore to the Pan-American highway.  Our villages included San Juan Atitlán (107), Santa 
Clara (126), Tzucubal (87), Cruz B (50), and Argueta (95) as shown in Figure 1.  While some of the 
villages were located within a few miles of one another, the nature of interaction in rural Guatemala is 
that people from different villages have little social contact with one another.  
(Insert Figure 1 here) 
Some historical background about our study area is important to interpreting our empirical 
work.  The Sololá province, within which our villages are located, formed part of the theater in which 
a long civil war was fought in Guatemala from 1960 through 1996, resulting in approximately 200,000 
civilian deaths.1  During this period, many Guatemalans in the Sololá province were forced to choose 
between membership in the guerrilla movements or in the civil patrols.  Moreover, instances of 
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betrayal within villages were common, where false accusations of guerrilla involvement resulted in the 
disappearances and executions of many innocent victims.  As a result, households often looked to an 
inward circle of trusted relationships.  These relationships commonly formed around the budding 
churches that were part of an indigenous evangelical movement within the country, during which the 
percentage of evangelicals increased over a few decades from a small percent to over 40 percent 
(Freston, 2001). The rise of evangelical Protestantism in Latin America has been attributed to the 
evangelical church’s focus on personal salvation, the alleviation of injustice, poverty and misery in the 
afterlife, support in coping with alcoholism, the spread of literacy, and the desire for economic gain 
(Garrard-Burnett, 2000).  This message is especially attractive to a people plagued by poverty, 
alcoholism and violence.   In the Sololá province, the percentage of evangelicals is even higher than 
most other areas in Guatemala (53% in our sample), ranging from 38% to 66% in our five villages.  
In our survey, we conducted interviews with village leaders to review general information 
about the village and gain an orientation of its layout.  In most cases, pre-existing maps of the 
villages were used to assign numbers to each household. Within each village, a smaller 
neighborhood area, generally encompassing approximately one-fourth to one-half of the village, 
was randomly selected for survey and a blanket approach was implemented to cover every 
household in the selected area.2  With the aid of local guides who acted as liaisons and translators 
when only local Mayan dialects were spoken, door-to-door interviews were conducted 
simultaneously by two research teams.  GPS coordinates were taken at each household to ensure 
an exact address for possible follow-up research and to capture information used to measure 
geographical neighborhood effects.   
The survey was centered on obtaining general household information, such as education, 
ownership of different assets (land and housing), membership in churches, and participation in 
village committees.  We also asked questions about household ownership of consumer goods, 
particularly bicycles, televisions, and cell phones.  Ownership of bicycles within villages ranged 
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between 12.2 and 67.4%, televisions between 30.1 and 75.8%, and cell phones between 2.4 and 
18.0%.  We asked our households if they had a current loan, and if so whether it was an informal 
loan (from family, friends, or a local moneylender), a microfinance loan (from one of several 
microfinance institutions operating in the area), or a formal bank loan (from either a private, or 
state-sponsored bank). The percentage of households with informal loans ranged from 2.6 to 13.4% 
between villages, microfinance from 19.2 to 31.5%, and formal bank credit from 1.9 to 9.6%.  
Summary statistics on these and other variables from each of the five villages are given in Table 1. 
(Insert Table 1 here) 
III. Estimation Strategy and Estimations 
A. Empirical Model 
 Upon considering the likely sources of networks that would be relevant to credit decisions, we 
considered the exploration of peer effects in three reference groups: 1) the entire sample of houses 
surveyed in the village; 2) households’ immediate geographical neighborhoods; and 3) the households’ 
church membership.  For the village effect on each household, we calculated jv
n
i
ijv yyn
=∑
=1
1 , or the 
mean of a given behavior j  among the n  members of a household’s village v, where { }1 ,0∈ijvy .   To 
measure effects from geographical neighbors weighted by proximity, we use a gravity equation, equal 
to ∑
=
n
i
ijv
i
y
d1~
~2
~
1 , which heavily weights the behavior j  of household i's closest neighbors (~i) in i's 
village v.  To examine the influence of those in household i's church c, we obtain the mean of behavior 
j  observed by other m  households that attend household i's church (~i), or jc
m
i
ijc yym
=∑
=1~
~
1 .  
  We seek to estimate the following equation first suggested by Manski (1993, 1995):  
  ( ) ( ) ( ) iiikkkjkikijk wxxwExyEwxyE ελδγβα +′+′+′+′+=,   (1) 
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where yijk is the probability of a given discrete behavior j (equal to 0 or 1) by household i  in 
network k, xk is i's network one of our three reference groups (village, neighbor, or church), wi is 
household i’s socio-economic status, and β, γ, δ, and λ are parameter vectors, and εi an error term.  
Here, if β ≠ 0 there are endogenous effects, if γ ≠ 0, there are contextual effects, and if δ ≠ 0, there 
are correlated effects.  The parameter λ measures the direct effect of socioeconomic variables on 
the expectation of y. 
 As shown in Manski (1995), the model is unable to be estimated using linear estimation 
techniques due to perfect co-linearity among the independent variables, the basis of the well-
known "reflection problem".  However, as demonstrated by Brock and Durlauf (2002, 
THEOREM 2), Manski’s result is specific to a class of linear estimators, such that the above 
equation is estimable in the context of non-linear estimators, e.g. logit or multinomial logit.  
  Nevertheless, in estimating equation (1) one must continue to be careful with issues of 
multicolinearity.  A simple example illustrates the problem: Suppose one seeks to analyze a given 
variable at the village level and there are three villages with membership in the villages given by 
dummy variables x1 , x2, and x3.  Average wealth in each village is given by 321  and , , www , and we 
also include the independent variable ( )kk xwE  given in (1).  Even after omitting the dummy for 
the third village in the standard fashion, a problem remains that ( ) 02211 =−−− xwxwcxwE kk , 
i.e. that this subset of the independent variables is collinear.  For example, suppose that the average 
wealth index in village 1 and 2 is 0.43 and 0.25, respectively.  This yields a scenario in which 
( ) 005.013.030.0 21 =+−− xxxwE kk , i.e. a subset of the right-hand-side variables are a linear 
function of one another. 
Our estimations make some important assumptions in addressing this issue.  In our church 
network estimations we do not include dummy variables for every church, but rather for type of 
church, in particular evangelical or Catholic.  This implicitly assumes that any correlated effects may 
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be different between the two types of churches, but are similar within the two basic types of 
churches.  We are comfortable with this assumption since there are strong similarities between 
Catholic churches in the study area and strong similarities between evangelical churches (nearly all 
are Pentecostal or closely related), but substantial differences between the two.   
In our estimations of peer effects at the village level, we address the multicollinearity issue 
by using village fixed-effects in some estimations in which we focus on the influence of networks 
at the neighbor and church levels, while in other estimations we include village networks without 
using village-level fixed effects.  In the latter estimations, coefficients on the mean values for the 
dependent variable within a village must be interpreted as representing a combination of 
endogenous and correlated effects.  
Geographical neighbor networks are obviously different for every household, making it 
impossible in any respect to establish a correlated effect for example by, say, including a dummy 
variable for every household location.  Thus our estimations assume that any significant 
correlated effects that operate through geographical neighborhoods are accounted for by our 
variables that directly account for socioeconomic differences between households, and that 
contextual effects are accounted for by differences in the socioeconomic attributes of household 
i's geographical neighbors.  If they do not, then our coefficients on endogenous effects for 
geographical neighbors may also include some correlated effects.   
We begin our estimations by examining peer effects on household purchase and adoption 
of three relatively new consumer goods in rural Guatemala: televisions, bicycles, and cellular 
phones.  We use these as a benchmark of comparison for understanding the magnitude of peer 
effects for different types of credit, yet we find the peer effects uncovered in the adoption of these 
consumer goods to be interesting in themselves.  The villages in our sample were electrified at 
different times within the last two to three decades.  As a result, televisions are a relatively new 
commodity in comparison with developed countries.  Most bicycles in the area are mountain 
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bikes, which became a rapidly adopted technology in rural Guatemala following their innovation in 
the United States during the early 1980s.  Mountain bikes allow for rapid transportation over 
bumpy roads and paths, and are cheaper than either automobiles or horses.  In the late 1990s, 
several mobile phone companies operating in Guatemala began to install a network of cellular 
towers that blanketed areas with coverage previously untouched by land lines.3  Many of these 
companies quickly offered prepaid phone cards allowing Guatemalans without previous landline 
access to make domestic calls for 1 quetzal (13 cents) or less per minute.  The number of 
households using cell phones increased rapidly, such that by the time of our 2004 survey nearly 
10% of the rural households in our sample were using cell phones. 
B. Empirical Results 
Our empirical approach is to first estimate the effect of socioeconomic variables on the 
adoption of the new consumer technologies as well as on credit access.  Thus we performed a 
simple logit estimation on cell phone, television, and bicycle ownership using years of formal 
education, age, a wealth proxy (based on an index of asset ownership that excludes the dependent 
variable), a dummy variable equal to one if the household head was a member of a village 
committee, and a dummy variable for evangelical household (as opposed to Catholic).  With respect 
to space constraints, we do not include these regressions here, but the results are straightforward: 
education is significant at the 95th percent level of confidence for all three consumer goods, and 
wealth is significant at the 99 th percent level for all three.  Committee membership is significant at 
the 95th percent level for cell phones.  In all other cases, variables display insignificant direct effects.   
For our estimations on credit source, we performed multinomial logit estimations with the 
dependent variable equal to either “no current loan” (our base category), “informal loan,” 
“microfinance loan,” or “formal bank loan.”   In these estimations, higher levels of education and 
wealth were significant at the 95th percent level for accessing bank and microfinance credit, but 
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(not surprisingly) insignificant for informal credit.  Committee membership was significant at no 
less than the 90 percent level for all three types of credit. 
These preliminary estimations are relevant because by (1) we would expect to find 
contextual effects when the mean of these directly significant socioeconomic variables (wealth, 
education, and leadership) varies between household networks.  Hence in our final estimations, we 
include the mean of directly significant socioeconomic variables within household i ’s network k, 
or ( )ks xwE , excluding household i from the computation. (Because of the relative scarcity of 
community leaders within the sample, we do not include this mean for each network.) 
The results of our estimations for peer effects on ownership of cell phones, televisions, and 
bicycles are given in Table 2.  The independent variables are presented in a way that separates 
endogenous, contextual, correlated, and direct effects, with the aforementioned caveats.  In the first 
three columns of Table 2, we use a standard logit estimation on equation (1), where again we find 
that the results show education and wealth to be strongly associated with ownership of each of the 
goods.  A calculation of the marginal effects from the logit coefficients reported in columns 1, 2, and 
3 in Table 2 indicates that a one-standard-deviation increase in the household wealth index increases 
the probability of cell phone ownership by 3.5 percentage points ( x = 9.3%), television ownership 
by 28.9 percentage points ( x = 49.4%), and bicycle ownership by 14.1 percentage points ( x = 
33.7%).  A sixth-grade education increases the probability of cell phone ownership (over no formal 
education) by 1.8 percentage points, television ownership by 16.6 percentage points, and bicycle 
ownership by 9.6 percentage points.  These estimates remain virtually the same in our fixed-effect 
estimations in Columns 4, 5, and 6. 
We uncover little evidence of contextual effects for any of the consumer goods, especially at 
the church and village level.  Average village wealth is significant in all three estimations in Columns 
1, 2, and 3, but carries the unexpected sign for cell phone and television.  For bicycles, the positive 
and significant sign on "Average wealth in village" and "Percent bicycle ownership in village" is likely 
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to be picking up correlated effects due to differential village terrain due to the absence of village 
dummies, and because of the inconsistency of the signs of the village-level variables, we are hesitant 
to attribute the positive sign on bicycles to endogenous or contextual effects. 
(Insert Table 2 here) 
We are more confident in the estimations using fixed-effects at the village level in Columns 
4, 5, and 6 in Table 2.  Here we find evidence of endogenous effects for cell phone and television 
ownership among geographical neighbors at the 95 and 99 percent levels of confidence, respectively.  
We do not find evidence of geographical neighborhood effects for bicycles.  For cell phones, 
endogenous effects at the neighborhood level are likely to occur as a result of informational 
conformity: people become convinced of the usefulness of cell phones by observing their neighbors' 
use of them, finding out how to purchase and use calling cards, and so forth.  For televisions, the 
neighborhood-level endogenous effect is most likely a hybrid of Young's (1998) "pure" and 
"instrumental" conformity, where households purchase a television in order to follow programs, 
such as the popular Latin American novelas (soap operas) and/or soccer matches, that are closely 
tracked and the subject of much discussion among friends and neighbors.   
These estimations on the consumer goods can be compared with our multinomial logit 
estimations on credit source found in Table 3.  In these estimations, education and wealth 
continue to exert a direct influence on the type of credit accessed by a household.  They are 
both positively associated with formal bank and microfinance borrowing and either 
insignificantly or negatively related to informal borrowing.  Microfinance borrowing is also 
significantly associated with community leadership.  As seen in Column 2, but especially in the 
village fixed-effect estimations in Column 5, evangelicals also appear to be more likely to 
access microfinance.  Though some of the microfinance institutions in these areas are faith-
based, they explicitly display no preference for borrowers based on religion, thus making the 
result more likely a demand-side rather than supply-side phenomenon.  Age of household head 
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has a significant negative association with formal bank loans, while statistically insignificant 
point estimates indicate a negative relationship to microfinance and a positive association with 
informal loans.  
(Insert Table 3 here) 
Table 3 also yields some evidence of contextual effects, especially for microfinance.  
Education is correlated with increased access to microfinance, and even controlling for individual 
household-level education, as average education levels increase within a village, the probability of a 
household having a microfinance loan increases.  Marginal effects show that being in a village where 
the average level of education is one grade higher ( x = 2.66 years) increases the probability of 
microfinance borrowing by 13.7 percentage points.  In contrast, an additional year of education 
decreases the probability of informal borrowing by 4.8 percentage points.  In general, both formal and 
informal borrowing appears to be accentuated when households are members of “wealthier” (less 
poor) churches and villages, and microfinance is more likely when households are members of more 
educated churches and villages.  Though some of these coefficients do not carry statistical 
significance, the pattern is manifest. 
The most interesting result of the credit source estimations in Table 3 is the presence of 
endogenous effects in credit access.  Some endogenous effects appear to exist at the neighborhood 
level, especially in informal borrowing.  Controlling for other factors, having geographical neighbors 
with informal credit makes it more likely that an individual household also has informal credit.  
But the endogenous effects in Table 3 operate primarily within church networks.  In both the full 
estimation of equation (1) in Columns 1-3 and in the village fixed-effects estimation in Columns 4-6, 
a higher fraction of fellow church members with a given type of credit (bank, microfinance, or 
informal) yields a higher probability of the individual household having the same specific type of 
credit.  Not surprisingly, the magnitude of the effect is strongest for informal credit, where close 
relationships are likely to be most important, but it is statistically significant for all types of credit, at 
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the 99th percent confidence level in the fixed-effect estimations.  While there are some cross-effects 
from one type of credit to the likelihood of a household accessing a different type, a clear pattern 
remains in the data with peer effects remaining strongest within a single type of credit. 
The immediate question that arises from this result surrounds the possibility of 
unobservable correlates that would indicate the presence of endogenous effects, but be a result of 
other factors.  One possibility might occur if microfinance borrowing groups were to cluster 
within churches, but we only saw evidence of individual microfinance lending in villages.  We 
found no evidence that microfinance institutions were using churches to recruit members; 
moreover, this would fail to explain the clustering of formal bank borrowing and informal lending 
in churches.  It is tempting to argue also that the results could arise from a kind of “Protestant 
Ethic” phenomenon that governs a self-selection of highly motivated entrepreneurs into certain 
churches.  If our dependent variable were entrepreneurial activity, this would indeed seem 
possible, yet even so it would likely be identified by our evangelical dummy variable.  However, 
especially in our rural Guatemalan context, it seems unlikely that (controlling for wealth, 
education, and other factors) entrepreneurs would self-select into churches based on credit access, 
moreover by specific type of credit access.   
Another possibility is that it is through networks of friendship rather than church 
membership per se  that credit relationships operate.  We actually view this as quite plausible, if not 
probable, and it may very well be true in light of the aforementioned political and religious changes 
in the recent history of Guatemala, in which the rural churches have come to form the hub of a 
household’s network of close relationships.  Some of these relationships may have existed prior to 
common church membership, with others forming as a result of church membership.  In a context 
where the development of human capital and financial assets has been severely stunted, these social 
relationships appear to play a key role in access to information about financial opportunities.  Given 
the level of accentuated trust that exists within the churches, the most plausible explanation for 
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endogenous effects at the church network level relates to the well-understood asymmetric 
information issues in credit markets, such that within churches credit information circulates 
regarding credit opportunities, informal screening of borrowers takes place that mitigates problems 
of adverse selection, and reputational capital within the church helps mitigate problems of moral 
hazard.  Though it is outside of the focus of our empirical work to pin down the precise nature of 
the endogenous effect, it is most probable that our finding is capturing the often-observed 
phenomena of credit operating through friendship and other kinds of trust networks, such as 
illustrated in McMillan and Woodruff (1999), Woolcock and Narayan (2000), Fafchamps (2002), and 
Okten and Osili (2004).  
C. Elasticity of Social Imitation 
 How do the magnitudes of peer effects compare between credit and other possible foci of 
imitation such as consumer goods?  We find that they are surprisingly similar.  For each of our 
consumer goods and sources of credit we calculate an Elasticity of Social Imitation (ESI).  In symbols, 
let ( )
j
jk
jk
ij
SI y
x
dx
dy
ksij
ijprob ⋅=Δ
Δ=
network  'in  behavior %
 householdby  behavior %ε , where the first fraction in the expression 
is the estimated marginal effect derived from the estimations in Tables 2 and 3, xjk is the (potentially) 
weighted mean of behavior j within a network k,4 and yj  is the mean of behavior j  in the overall 
sample.  The ESI measures the percentage change in the likelihood of a behavior with respect to a 
percentage change in the prevalence of that behavior within a network, providing a common measure 
of social imitation. 
 As seen in Table 4, our estimations yield ESIs on our endogenous effects for credit that are 
similar in magnitude to those that we estimate for the consumer goods.  While point estimates on 
ESIs for cell phone and television ownership in church and neighborhood networks range from 
0.0954 to 0.255, our estimated ESIs for bank credit (0.179), microfinance (0.141), and informal credit 
                                                 
. 
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(0.167) land right in the middle of this range, and moreover are strikingly similar in magnitude to one 
another.  Point estimates of the ESI for microfinance and informal credit in neighborhood networks 
are about one-third the magnitude of their ESI within church networks.5  The magnitudes of these 
elasticities of social imitation appear reasonable to us: essentially they say that if the percentage of 
peers with a given type of credit in a closely knit social network doubles, the likelihood of an 
individual accessing that specific type of credit increases by about 15%.   
(Insert Table 4 here) 
 From estimated elasticities of social imitation, one can then compute a social imitation 
multiplier, which gives the equilibrium behavior within a group given the exogenous adoption of 
that behavior by some fraction X within a network.  For any given SIε , standard algebraic 
calculations show the social imitation multiplier to be equal to ( )SIε−11 .  Our point estimates 
yield a social imitation multiplier for formal bank credit equal to 1.218, with a 95% confidence 
interval of (1.013, 1.529).  For microfinance our estimate is 1.164 (0.977, 1.440) and for informal 
lending, 1.201 (0.993, 1.518).  The interpretation here is that if, for example, formal bank credit is 
exogenously introduced to some fraction x of households within a network, peer effects will 
produce a sequence of imitation such that the equilibrium fraction of formal bank credit within the 
network will ultimately settle at 1.218x.   
IV. Conclusion 
Our research indicates the presence of endogenous peer effects in credit access are similar 
in magnitude to those found in the purchase and ownership of our three benchmark consumer 
goods: cell phones, televisions, and bicycles.  These endogenous peer effects appear to some 
extent among geographical neighbors, but appear most strongly within church networks among 
our sample of households in Guatemala.  We find wealth and education to be directly correlated 
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with ownership of each of our consumer goods, and also to credit access, making formal bank 
borrowing, and microfinance borrowing more likely.   
We believe that these results have implications for the introduction of microfinance in new 
areas, where we find evidence that endogenous peer effects are significant in its adoption.   
Moreover, we calculate elasticities of social imitation that are remarkably similar between formal 
loans, informal loans, and microfinance.  We find that the importance of social networks to the 
adoption of microfinance is similar in magnitude to other types of credit, and the social network 
effects that we estimate with different types of credit are within the range of those we estimate for 
the adoption of new consumer technologies.  However, the magnitude of the social network effects 
we estimate for microfinance is relatively modest, suggesting that there remains a strong role for the 
promotion of microfinance by institutions themselves.  
 
 
1 "Clinton: Support for Guatemala Was Wrong," Washington Post, March 11, 1999; Page A1 
2 That neighbors be closely located to one another was key in our particular context for identifying behavioral 
transmission through geographic proximity. 
3 The cellular phone companies with largest market shares in the country are Telefónica, Claro, and Tigo. 
4 For the geographical neighbor network, this mean is weighted by distance through our behavioral gravity model. 
5 Although the marginal effect for peer effects for microfinance at the neighborhood level carries an insignificant 
t-statistic, because the point estimate is nearly identical to that of informal credit, we include it in Table 4. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics by Village 
(Means and Standard Deviations) 
 
 
Variable 5 Villages Argueta Cruz-B San Juan Sta. Clara Tzucubal 
Number of Observations: 464 95 50 107 128 87 
       
Education level (years) 2.6601 3.9468 1.7959 2.6075 2.9921 1.2771 
 (3.04) (3.47) (2.38) (3.17) (3.03) (1.77) 
       
Age 36.6205 39.6484 37.7234 37.1700 36.1240 32.642 
 (13.58) (13.05) (14.54) (12.36) (14.84) (12.33) 
       
Wealth proxy1 0.4286 0.4415 0.3678 0.3566 0.4871 0.4527 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.10) (0.14) (0.18) (0.18) 
       
Leaders (on vill. committee) 0.0582 0.1368 0.0400 0.0000 0.0310 0.0964 
 (0.23) (0.35) (0.20) 0.00 (0.17) (0.30) 
       
Evangelical protestants 0.5323 0.6632 0.3800 0.4486 0.5736 0.5181 
 (0.50) (0.48) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) 
       
Tzutujil speaker 0.2306 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 (0.42) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
       
Own Television 0.4935 0.7579 0.701 0.4245 0.3984 0.3012 
 (0.50) (0.43) (0.46) (0.50) (0.49) (0.46) 
       
Own cell phone 0.0931 0.1684 0.1800 0.0849 0.0546 0.0241 
 (0.29) (0.38) (0.39) (0.28) (0.23) (0.15) 
       
Own bicycle 0.3369 0.6737 0.5800 0.1215 0.2265 0.2530 
 (0.47) (0.47) (0.50) (0.33) (0.42) (0.44) 
       
Formal bank loan 0.0495 0.0967 0.0370 0.0190 0.0535 0.0362 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.013) (0.0006) (0.05) (0.01) 
       
Microfinance loan 0.2515 0.1983 0.1925 0.2397 0.3153 0.2640 
 (0.16) (0.22) (0.09) (0.10) (0.18) (0.04) 
       
Informal credit 0.0732 0.1337 0.0618 0.0259 0.0785 0.0636 
 (0.07) (0.09) (0.032) (0.0036) (0.07) (0.03) 
1 Reflects an average of a household's possession of the following: electricity, potable water, car, bicycle, refrigerator, television, 
and radio.  (Television and bicycle were dropped from the index in their respective estimations.) 
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Table 2: Cell Phone, Television, and Bicycle Ownership:  
Endogenous, Contextual, and Correlated Effects--Logit Estimations 
 
                                                                          Full Model:                                          Village Fixed Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Cell Phone Television Bicycle Cell Phone Television Bicycle 
  Endogenous Effects:  
% in Church Own 2.778 0.572 -0.468 1.589 0.545 -0.745 
 (0.95) (1.09) (1.13) (0.50) (1.03) (0.75) 
       
% Neighbors Own 0.091** 0.023*** 0.009 0.083** 0.023*** 0.003 
 (2.03) (3.13) (0.45) (2.06) (3.03) (0.15) 
       
% in Village Own† -14.09* 0.659 3.716***    
 (1.66) (0.61) (3.97)    
       
  Contextual Effects:  
Avg Educ Church -0.312* -0.238 0.024 -0.198 -0.214 0.036 
 (1.93) (1.32) (0.11) (1.02) (1.12) (0.17) 
       
Avg Educ Neighbors 0.001 -0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 
 (0.36) (0.02) (0.10) (0.34) (0.63) (0.19) 
       
Avg Educ Village 0.640** 0.167 -0.128    
 (2.50) (0.86) (0.73)    
       
Avg Wealth Church 0.301 0.613 0.419 -1.054 0.376 0.318 
 (0.22) (0.40) (0.18) (0.69) (0.24) (0.13) 
       
Avg Wealth Neighbor -0.038** -0.029*** -0.010 -0.019 -0.028** -0.009 
 (2.07) (2.71) (0.55) (1.08) (2.49) (0.54) 
       
Avg Wealth Village -12.50*** -4.29*** 8.020***    
 (6.66) (3.27) (2.62)    
       
  Correlated and Direct Effects:  
Education 0.101*** 0.111*** 0.082 0.108*** 0.111*** 0.084 
 (4.04) (2.84) (1.33) (3.90) (2.76) (1.33) 
       
Age 0.002 -0.004 -0.013*** -0.000 -0.004 -0.014*** 
 (0.07) (0.47) (4.21) (0.02) (0.49) (4.09) 
       
Wealth Proxy  6.012** 6.83*** 4.254*** 5.625** 6.751*** 4.146*** 
 (2.22) (9.58) (3.87) (2.26) (8.90) (3.99) 
       
Committee Member 0.909* 0.042 -0.539 1.046* 0.105 -0.528 
 (1.70) (0.06) (1.43) (1.87) (0.15) (1.51) 
       
Evangelical 0.078 0.228 -0.509*** 0.141 0.248 -0.516*** 
 (0.53) (1.19) (2.95) (1.06) (1.30) (2.95) 
       
Constant -1.050 -2.434*** -6.975*** -5.824* -3.137*** -1.070*** 
 (0.61) (3.14) (4.85) (1.94) (4.89) (3.06) 
       
Observations 409 409 410 409 409 410 
logit coefficients, t-statistics in parentheses calculated from village-level clustered standard errors  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; † may also capture correlated effects. 
 
 23
Table 3: Type of Credit Access: 
Endogenous, Contextual, and Correlated Effects 
 
                                                       Multinomial Logit Estimations 
                                                                                     Full Model                                         Village Fixed Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Bank Microfinance Informal Bank Microfinance Informal 
  Endogenous Effects:  
% in Church Bank Credit 4.562*** 5.564*** 0.254 3.563*** 5.256*** 1.253 
 (4.90) (6.15) (0.13) (3.68) (3.75) (0.19) 
% in Church MFI Credit  -2.627 1.405*** -0.177 -2.057 1.200*** -0.937 
 (1.44) (6.86) (0.06) (0.93) (8.56) (0.31) 
% in Church Informal Credit 3.364* -9.92*** 12.02*** 2.232** -8.71*** 8.267*** 
 (1.94) (3.47) (6.19) (2.55) (3.78) (2.78) 
Neighbors Bank Credit  -0.028 0.020*** -0.187 -0.096 0.020*** -0.45*** 
 (0.65) (3.28) (1.57) (1.41) (2.98) (2.80) 
Neighbors MFI Credit  0.061*** 0.020 0.119*** 0.075*** 0.024 0.192*** 
 (3.51) (0.55) (3.38) (2.63) (0.80) (3.61) 
Neighbors Infor. Credit  0.023 -0.056 0.108** -0.090 -0.044 -0.05*** 
 (0.37) (0.84) (2.41) (1.18) (0.54) (4.49) 
% Village Bank Credit† -53.62** -53.01* 377.2***    
 (2.26) (1.79) (3.97)    
% Village MFI Credit† -2.319** -0.799 18.01***    
 (2.42) (0.28) (3.02)    
% Village Informal Credit† 30.584* 34.064 -205.1**    
 (1.95) (1.22) (3.92)    
  Contextual Effects:  
Avg Education --Church -0.321 0.245 -0.002 -0.508** 0.121 -0.555* 
 (1.22) (1.21) (0.01) (2.32) (0.43) (1.87) 
Avg Education--Neighbor -0.006 0.001 0.002 -0.006 0.001 0.014*** 
 (1.48) (0.32) (0.63) (1.29) (0.75) (9.23) 
Avg Education --Village 0.180 1.467*** -3.49***    
 (0.45) (7.80) (3.08)    
Avg Wealth--Church 3.312** -3.155** 1.859 4.598*** -2.384 7.46*** 
 (2.26) (2.43) (0.90) (2.90) (1.19) (4.04) 
Avg Wealth--Neighbors -0.009 -0.021 -0.05*** -0.005 -0.022 -0.023*** 
 (1.15) (0.87) (7.26) (0.52) (1.20) (3.97) 
Avg Wealth--Village 0.493 -14.9*** -33.2***    
 (0.10) (2.60) (2.86)    
  Correlated and Direct Effects:  
Education 0.198*** 0.149*** 0.032 0.182*** 0.155*** 0.024 
 (3.79) (5.23) (0.31) (2.92) (4.98) (0.23) 
Age -0.050** -0.020 0.011 -0.047 -0.021 0.017 
 (2.00) (0.85) (0.63) (1.64) (0.87) (0.86) 
Wealthproxy 2.691 2.259*** -1.532 2.259 1.907** -0.434 
 (1.25) (3.92) (0.99) (0.97) (2.55) (0.23) 
Committee 0.674 1.842*** 0.610 0.869 1.874*** 1.821 
 (0.66) (3.97) (0.85) (0.98) (4.08) (1.52) 
Evangelical  0.120 0.505*** 0.335 0.078 0.469** 0.193 
 (0.16) (3.07) (0.53) (0.10) (2.50) (0.45) 
Constant -2.964 0.493 10.279* -2.48*** -1.32*** -10.124*** 
 (1.24) (0.19) (1.74) (0.613) (11.48) (5.46) 
Observations 411 411 411 411 411 411 
Logit coefficients, t-statistics in parentheses calculated from village-level clustered standard errors  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; † may also capture correlated effects. 
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Table 4: Estimated Elasticities of Social Imitation 
             Consumer Good:                   Credit Source: 
Network: Cell Phone Television Bicycle   Bank Microfinance Informal 
Church 0.0954† 0.143† - 0.179** 0.141* 0.167** 
Neighborhood 0.125* 0.255†† - - 0.0478 0.0552†† 
Village - - - - - - 
†marginal coefficient significant only at 25-29% level; †† marginal coefficient significant only at 13-19% level. 
*marginal coefficient significant at 10%; **marginal coefficient significant at 5%; ***marginal coefficient significant at 1%. 
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